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A citadel of socialist values, the Cuban economy has resisted
the global trend of neoliberal financial reform that has swept
through other developing countries. As part of a modest liberali-
zation of the finance sector during the 1990s, however, the Cu-
ban government established the Cuban Central Bank in 1997.1
In the context of central bank governance, the neoliberal trend
in developing countries has been toward increased formal and
substantive central bank independence from executive over-
. 2
sight. The Cuban Central Bank bucks that trend. In the United
States, academic interest in legal aspects of the Cuban economy
is growing in tandem with its selective liberalization, despite
onerous federal governmental constraints on these studies. This
Article contributes to this literature by exploring the impact of
financial signaling by the Cuban government on decisions by
prospective foreign investors on whether to invest in Cuba. In
doing so, this Article asserts that Cuba could rehabilitate its
market credibility deficit and mitigate the effect of its legal dis-
abilities under U.S. law through collateralized debt transactions
in the open market and through monetary reforms.
This Article considers how central bank governance struc-
ture operates as an investment signal to potential foreign inves-
tors with respect to the term of their potential investments. Al-
l. See BANco CENTRAL DE CUBA, at http'//www.bc.gov.cu/english/home.asp (last
visited Apr. 10, 2005).
2. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Role of Central Banks in Bank Supervision in the
United States and the United Kingdom, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 411, 434 (2003).
[Vol. 27:3
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though rejecting the conventional explanation that central bank
independence signals low inflation, this discussion shows that
central bank independence does send a favorable investment
signal because independence shows official openness to oppor-
tunistic deal making (rent-seeking)3 with financial firms for a
longer term than deals possible with a dependent central bank.
It further shows that the Cuban Central Bank is not independ-
ent and hence, does not send a favorable investment signal to fi-
nancial firms considering investment with respect to term. Rec-
ognizing that proper financial signals induce foreign investment,
this Article proposes that Cuba may replicate some of the signal-
ing value of central bank independence through issuing collater-
alized government securities. This Article recommends comple-
mentary reforms to the Cuban and U.S. governments that would
increase the Cuban Central Bank's financial signaling capabili-
ties.
Part I suggests that the signaling value of central bank in-
dependence in developing countries reflects the value of poten-
tial rent-seeking between foreign investors and officials, rather
than expectations of low inflation. Part II describes Cuba's ac-
cess to foreign financing in the form of foreign direct investment
and credit flows and explains how Cuban monetary policy has
inhibited increased foreign financing. Part III explains how the
governance structure of the Cuban Central Bank signals that
the institution is not formally or substantively independent of
oversight from other governmental actors. Part IV urges the
Central Bank to issue collateralized governmental debt to repli-
cate-albeit only at the transactional level-some of the signal-
ing benefits of central bank independence. To complement this
proposal, Part V identifies crucial changes to U.S. law which
could improve Cuba's capacity to manage its public financing on
market terms. Part VI concludes by inviting other scholars to
encourage constructive discourse on Cuban credit market struc-
ture.
I. METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
This Part explains the meaning of central bank independ-
3. See discussion about rent-seeking infra Part I.B.
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ence as a signaling device for ensuring compliance across time
with bargained-for expectations of government officials and po-
litical and market constituencies. The idea that central bank in-
dependence attracts foreign investment to developing countries
by signaling low inflation is incorrect. Signaling refers to an in-
tentional message sent by party A-typically about party A's fu-
ture behavior-to party B in order to influence party B's be-
havior with respect to party A.4 The signaling considered here
refers to deliberate regulatory and market actions taken by the
Cuban Central Bank (Central Bank) observable to international
asset holders on the lookout for attractive investments. s Instead
of signaling low inflation, independence may reflect a political
economy in which private creditor interests influence central
bank design with respect to the term of financial arrangements.
The upshot of this view for the Central Bank is that it will not
4. For a general discussion of signaling theory and its origins in labor market
analysis, see L. PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 122-28 (1988). If
potential counterparties had relatively perfect information about each other, the benefits
of signaling would be limited. In the context of information asymmetry, though, in which
a counterparty struggles to glean meaningful information with which to assume finan-
cial risk, signaling may provide a basis for risk taking, albeit with imperfect information.
Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets, AM.
ECO. REV. 434,434 & n.1 (June 2002).
5. Of course, the impact of this investment signal varies with the liquidity of the
foreign investment. Consider the following example: assume a foreign investor invests in
a factory, a form of investment that is not liquidated easily or quickly. A signal from the
central bank in the country where the factory is located may not influence whether she
increases or decreases her investment because the transaction costs of reallocating the
capital in the factory are high (that is, she cannot exit her position intraday). Now, as-
sume a foreign investor is holding foreign bonds with a liquid secondary market. A cen-
tral bank signal to this investor will impact him more because, given the secondary mar-
ket, he can increase or decrease his securities position readily (net transaction costs of
course). In terms of its liquidity and exit transaction cost, a bank loan stands between
the direct investment and the security. See SYLVIA MAXFIELD, GATEKEEPERS OF
GROWTH: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL BANKING 35-44 (1997)
[hereinafter MAXFIELD, GATEKEEPERS OF GROWTH]. Moreover, an independence signal
means one thing to domestic creditors of a developed country and another thing to for-
eign creditors of a developing country. The difference may rest on the fact that developed
countries with stable currencies rely more on domestic savings from creditors interested
in the price stability of the national currency. Developing countries, though, have less
domestic savings and must look to foreign creditors, who may care less about the price
stability of the national currency because their obligations are often denominated and
settled in foreign exchange (that is, in a currency other than that of the borrower).
CUBAN CENTRAL BANK
become independent until the development of a private creditor
class capable of promoting its term and other balance sheet in-
terests through lobbying the public sector.
A. A Deflationary View of Central Bank Independence
The central bank independence hypothesis claims that a
central bank not accountable to elected officials is better at set-
ting interest rates, which in turn impact present consumption,
employment rates, the business cycle, and inflation. According
to the hypothesis, interest rates are best determined on the ba-
sis of a medium-term rather than short-term horizon. Reducing
interest rates increases present consumption and creates short-
term economic prosperity (and risks inflation).8 When elected of-
ficials control the central bank, interest rate determinations re-
flect the short-term survival strategies of self-interested incum-
bents exposed to the recurring risk of removal on Election Day.
In the interest of self-preservation, elected officials may reduce
interest rates before Election Day to create well-timed, albeit
short-lived, prosperity.9 When central bank governors with long
6. C.A.E. GOODHART, THE CENTRAL BANKAND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 63 (1995).
Monetary policy focuses on controlling inflation. Bank of England & The Times, How Do
Interest Rates Affect Inflation?, TARGET TWO POINT ZERO, at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/targettwopointzero/inflation/ratesAffectInflation.htm
(last visited Apr. 10, 2005). "Cheap" money (that is, low interest rates) encourages con-
sumer demand. Price increases in the cost of goods, and services erode the purchasing
power of the currency. Linda Boelter, Latest Fed Interest Rate Decisions Affect Consum-
ers, UW-EXTENSION, June 22, 2001, at httpJ/www.umex.edu/news/story.cfm/346. In-
creased demand for goods and services raises their prices and contributes to inflationary
pressure. Bank of England & The Times, supra. In contrast, raising interest rates re-
duces inflationary pressure and, all else being equal, increases the purchasing power of
the currency. Id.
7. GOODHART, supra note 6, at 67.
8. Id. at 61.
9. Market analysts, and presumably investors, know the rules of the game. Con-
sider this excerpt from an article on central banks in Latin America:
Elections are traditionally a time when monetary policies are loosened in
Latin America. During the past two Mexican presidential elections, for ex-
ample, the country has had an economic crisis. However, Rojas Suarez[,]
[Chief Economist for Latin America at Deutsche Bank,] points to the greater
stability during elections as a further sign of the greater monetary stability
in the region. "Governments always used to resort to the printing machine,"
she said. "But you won't see that this year with the elections in Argentina.
20051
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tenures determine monetary policy free of interference by
elected officials-so goes the hypothesis-the central bank sets
rates with better regard for long-term growth prospects. Accord-
ing to the independence hypothesis, monetary policy, so struc-
tured, will produce better inflation outcomes and optimize social
welfare. 1° Independence mechanisms can range from fully self-
binding to minimally self-binding. 1
As developing countries restructure their financial sectors to
attract more foreign capital, reform has been toward greater
central bank independence.12 Proponents of the central bank in-
dependence hypothesis assert that independence leads to good
inflation outcomes and it is the anticipation of this inflation out-
And I really don't think it will happen in Mexico, either."
Michael Peterson, Developing an Independent Streak: Central Banks in Latin America
Are Gaining Greater Autonomy While Succeeding at Controlling Inflation,
LATINFINANCE, Sept. 1999, at 24.
10. One scholar has argued that Latin American governments in particular should
strive for increased central bank independence. Juscelino F. Colares, Note, Formal Legal
Theory and the Surrender of Political Control Over Monetary Policy: What Can Ulysses'
Journal to Ithaca Teach Argentina About Appropriate Legal Farm?, 36 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 151,175 (2003):
[tihe final credit for the choice of appropriate form in the monetary policy
arena should go to the mature democracies of the West. Indeed, for so far
only they have been able to engineer an institutional design that prevents
the polity from being overwhelmed by the opportunistic pursuit of short-term
political gain. .. Western democracies have shown that the challenge for less
mature democracies of Latin America and elsewhere is to divert democracy
from its tendency to distort public policy from long- to mere short-term elec-
toral goals.
Id.
11.. See Marta Castello-Branco & Mark Swinburne, Central Bank Independence, 29
FIN. & DEV. 19 (1992). See infra Part IV for a description of collateralized debt as a
transactional rather than an institutional form of independence.
12. See MAXFIELD, GATEKEEPERS OF GROWTH, supra note 5, at 35. The following
remark in connection with the Brazilian Central Bank is typical of the emerging market
foreign investment literature: "Legislation granting the nominally autonomous Central
Bank full independence to set short-term interest rates would further increase confi-
dence in the depth and sincerity of the government's commitment to a market-based
economy." The Growth Challenge, LATINFINANCE, Sept. 2003, at 37-38. Understandably,
establishment of a central bank has been identified as one prerequisite institutional
element for a market economy in Cuba. See CUBA AT A CROSSROADS: POLITICS AND
ECONOMICS AFTER THE FOURTH PARTY CONGRESS 249, 253 (Jorge F. P4rez-L6pez ed.
1994) [hereinafter CUBA AT A CROSSROADS].
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come that foreign investors may find appealing.' 3 However, the
view that foreign investors read independence as a proxy for
good inflation outcomes engineered by an apolitical central bank
has recently come under sustained attack. Empirical evidence
links independence with good (that is, low) inflation outcomes,
not in developing countries, but only in more developed coun-
tries, which rely more on domestic savings and credit than on
foreign financing. 14 Foreign investors in a developing country
know, therefore, that not mere independence will protect their
investments from loss due to ensuing inflation.
Why then would a developing country's government claim
that increasing the independence of its central bank would sig-
nal creditworthiness to international asset holders? The answer
lies not in the inflation correlation of independence but in view-
ing central bank independence as a long-term deal between offi-
cials and the financial sector, that is, rent-seeking.' 5 The follow-
13. See MAXFIELD, GATEKEEPERS OF GROWTH, supra note 5, at 36. By promising to
preserve asset values, so the corollary goes, an independent central bank reassures the
investor about her returns.
14. Independence has been correlated with low inflation in industrialized coun-
tries. See Joe Peek et al., Is Banking Supervision Central to Central Banking?, 114 Q.J.
ECON. 629 (1999). However, no such correlation exists between formal legal independ-
ence and inflation in developing countries. Sylvia Maxfield, Financial Incentives and
Central Bank Authority in Industrializing Nations, 46 WORLD POL. 556, 557 (1994). Af-
ter reviewing statistical data de-linking central bank independence from low inflation
outcomes, Maxfield puts it this way, "[i]f legal independence does not necessarily explain
the likelihood of successful anti-inflationary efforts by a central bank, one needs to look
elsewhere for an explanation of central bank behavior and capacity." Id. She claims that
it is the central bank's networks and reputation-and not formal independence-that
ultimately allow a central bank to control inflation:
The central bank's effective exercise of authority to prevent inflation re-
quires a special relationship with potential proponents of expansionary pol-
icy that is not well characterized as independence. The respect other govern-
ment officials and political leaders have for central bank policy positions may
be founded upon close social and/or political relations rather than upon the
bank's independence or autonomy.
Id. at 558 (emphasis added). Although this argument focuses on the deployment of cen-
tral bankers' social capital to reduce inflation, this same capital is fallow ground for rent-
seeking. See discussion infra note 15 and accompanying text.
15. Economists refer to this type of deal making as "rent-seeking." Rent-seeking
refers to the extraction of value through manipulation of the economic and legal envi-
ronment with means other than the investment or labor in a competitive market. I use
the term here to refer to deal making between government officials with discretion over
2005]
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ing Part will further explain the rent-seeking argument.
B. Using Rent-Seeking Analysis to Track Creditor Influence on
Government Design
Among regulatory processes, central banking is especially
suited for rent-seeking-and concomitantly rent-seeking analy-
sis-because a central bank is perhaps the only government ac-
tor that performs its regulatory functions on the market by
transacting in the market again and again. 16 Hence, an ideal fo-
rum for deal making is created between officials and market
participants, for whom each interest rate determination is an
opportunity to make a deal, monitor prior deals, or retaliate for
breach. Seen this way, commercial banks in the United States
seek rents happily by pressing their dynamic preferences about
the discount rate through the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee. 7 More generally, rent-seeking provides a critical perspective
economic regulation and the self-interested market participants affected by this eco-
nomic regulation. Gordon Tullock of the George Mason University School of Law intro-
duced the concept of rent-seeking in a seminal 1967 article in connection with the wel-
fare costs of rent-seeking. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies,
and Thefts, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 224-32 (1967); Gordon Tullock, The Origin Rent Seeking
Concept, 2 INTL J. Bus. & ECON. 1 (2003) (clarifying the provenance of his idea). Obvi-
ously, by endorsing activity to signal rent-seeking, this Article considers the potential
welfare gains of rent-seeking.
16. Purchasing government securities in the open market to influence interest
rates epitomizes this merger of regulatory function and market action. For example, in
the United States, government securities open market operations are a tool of monetary
policy. THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS 35-42, THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pf.htm
(last visited Apr. 10, 2005). Open market operations involve the purchase and sale of
government securities in public markets in order to impact the amount of liquidity in the
banking system. Id. at 35. A central bank absorbs liquidity from the banking system by
selling government securities from its portfolio of securities. Id. at 36, 39. These transac-
tions impact the credit supply in the banking system. Id. at 35-36. For example, selling
government securities to banks absorbs their excess liquid resources and thereby re-
duces the amount of available credit. See id. at 36. Conversely, buying government secu-
rities from bank portfolios adds liquid resources to the banking system and, hence, in-
creases the credit capacity of banks. Id. at 35. For the Central Bank to participate in
open market operations, the State Council would have to clarify whether the Central
Bank may conduct open market operations in government securities. At present, the
Central Bank may not directly purchase government securities. See DECRETO-LEY 172
art. 20 (1997) (Cuba).
17. The discount rate is the overnight rate charged by the Federal Reserve to
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from which to view banking history, such as how the U.S. Fed-
eral Reserve System became independent of the U.S. Treasury. 8
Rent-seeking is particularly useful for analyzing foreign in-
vestment in developing countries because neoliberal conven-
tional wisdom advocates a tight nexus between authorities and
market participants during the construction of a country's finan-
banks seeking collateralized short-term or agricultural credit. The base rate from which
other market interest rates derive, the discount rate determines the prospective cost of
money (banks' main factor input) and the price risk of fixed-rate assets and liabilities.
For an excellent discussion of discount window operations in the United States, see
DAVID L. MENGLE, INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET 23-35 (1986) for an excellent
discussion of discount window operations in the United States. As noted, the Federal
Open Market Committee seamlessly integrates commercial bank money preferences into
rate setting:
Contrary to popular opinion in the United States, interest rates are not set
by the Board of Governors (BOG) of the Federal Reserve System (Fed), but
by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), that includes the BOG as
well as the presidents of twelve privately-owned regional Federal Reserve
Banks... If the regional bank presidents who sit on the FOMC are not ac-
countable to Congress or the President, then to whom are they accountable?
To which constituencies? By law, they are accountable to the private com-
mercial banks that own the shares of each regional Federal Reserve Bank.
See Timothy A. Canova, Financial Liberalization, International Monetary Dis/order, and
the Neoliberal State, 15 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 1279, 1295-96 (2000).
18. Milton Freidman describes how the Federal Reserve System gained its inde-
pendence in monetary policy from the Department of the Treasury in the Treasury-
Federal Reserve Accord of 1951. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A
MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1867-1960 623-27 (1963). Between 1941
and 1951, the U.S. Treasury directed the Federal Reserve to prop-up the government
securities market to reduce the government's borrowing costs, hence easing war-related
financing. Id. at 546-91, 596-601, 610-12. In 1951, the Treasury and the Federal Re-
serve reached an agreement providing that the Federal Reserve would no longer actively
support the Treasury's borrowing rate by buying Treasury securities. Id. at 623-24. Al-
though Friedman does not address the microeconomic incentives of the institutions in-
volved, rent-seeking could also explain the birth of the Accord. During the war years and
afterwards, financial firms had accumulated surpluses thanks to government-engineered
low interest rates. These firms faced the risk that a future government might abandon
this rate policy or-worse still-increase interest rates, which would increase funding
costs and reduce asset values. Placing the timing of the Accord in the context of commer-
cial banks' self-interest regarding their then balance sheets, that is, applying a rent-
seeking approach to the events described by Friedman, suggests that these firms had a
strong financial interest in reducing inflation. As a result, these firms would have pre-
ferred to see interest rate determinations made by a rate setting mechanism, that is, the
Federal Reserve System, to which these firms had access through relationships with the
Federal Reserve member bank, rather than by elected officials.
2005]
HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 27:3
cial infrastructure.19 Rent-seeking is also more relevant in a po-
litical economy-like Cuba's-in which the government com-
mands economic ownership and production. °
An academic authority on central banking has forcefully ar-
gued how rent-seeking may contribute to the emergence of inde-
pendence in central bank governance.2 ' An independent central
bank represents a loss of executive discretion to politicians who
could otherwise exploit interest rate setting for their own career
(or other) interests. 22 Self-serving politicians would sacrifice such
19. In this sector, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) exercises the greatest
normative power in articulating and enforcing the design and operation of central bank-
ing in developing countries. Consider how the following exhortation towards active gov-
ernment involvement in planning the financial sector necessarily requires close negotia-
tions with market participants:
[Tihe authorities-debt manager, central bank, and the regulatory author-
ity-should play an active role in fostering the development of efficient mar-
ket structures for government securities markets. In the case of developing
countries and economies in transition where financial markets are less-
developed, an active role of the authorities in encouraging efficient market
organization can be a powerful catalyst in the development of government
securities markets. In turn, these markets help support debt management,
monetary policy, and financial market reforms.
Peter Dattels, The Microstructure of Government Securities Markets, in IMF WORKIUNG
PAPER 36 (1995) (offering superb taxonomy of government securities market structure
and their policy implications).
20. For example, the Cuban Constitution provides that the government directs the
economy for socialist ends. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA art. 16 (Cuba)
(amended 1992) ("The State organizes, directs, and controls the national economy consis-
tent with a plan which guarantees the country's programmed development in order to
strengthen the socialist system, to satisfy the material and cultural needs of society and
its citizens. . ."). Although economists usually criticize rent-seeking as resulting in an
inefficient allocation of resources, in the case of a command economy with only a nascent
private sector, such as, Cuba, one-off deals between officials and private constituencies-
which may not be fully legalizable within the constraints of formal law-may contribute
to economic arrangements with benefits to parties outside of the rent-seeking deal.
21. Geoffrey P. Miller, An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence, 27
J. LEGAL STUD. 433 (1998). Professor Miller is the Director of the Center for the Study of
Central Banks at the New York University School of Law. He does not offer empirical
examples of rent-seeking by the constituencies of a would-be central bank, due perhaps
to the relative obscurity in which central banks operate-a fact berated by populist advo-
cates of increased transparency. He does, however, identify the specific economic trans-
action-the deal between officials and finance firms-responsible for the emergence of
independence. Id. at 452-53.
22. Id. at 434.
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a valuable right only because the establishment of an independ-
ent central bank represents a way for these politicians to extract
rents from special interest groups by promising ex ante not to
produce inflation.23 In other words, by making a longer-term
deal with special interest groups not to inflate the currency, the
politician can actually extract more rents than if she makes an
initial deal with the group, encourages inflation to disrupt the
deal, and then extracts new rents in exchange for resolving the
conflict in favor of her rent-seeking counterparty.24 But:
[Tihe politician needs a mechanism for reliably pre-
committing not to engage in inflationary actions. The
independent central bank is a relatively reliable (al-
though not perfect) precommitment mechanism. Thus,
sel'-interested politicians may favor independent cen-
tral banks even though, in doing so, they relinquish the
enormously important power of price-level control.25
To be more explicit, the rent-seeking deal between the offi-
cial and the political or market constituency is an extralegal
contract 26 with no formal enforcement mechanism but imbued
23. Id. at 435.
24. In the case of Cuba, such a long term deal might help to extend the term of Cu-
ban government borrowing.
25. Id. at 453. Ulysses' intertemporal conflict with the Sirens often appears in the
central banking literature as a metaphor for how formal independence acts as a pre-
commitment mechanism. Consider this elegant passage:
In modern economic terms, Ulysses faced a problem of time inconsistency in
his optimal plan. His optimal plan was to listen to the Sirens and then con-
tinue on his journey. But this was time-inconsistent, because once he em-
barked on the plan of listening to the Sirens, he would not be able to imple-
ment and accomplish the later part of this plan- returning home... Ulysses
then elaborated an "optimal plan" in which he came up with the idea of deny-
ing himself his legitimate right to decide the ship's course at some point in
the future. He instructed his men to tie him up to the mast and ignore any
orders to do anything other than sail away from the reefs after some pre-
established, planned point. To assure total compliance from his crew, Ulys-
ses told them to plug their ears and row.
Colares, supra note 10, at 158 (citations omitted).
26. This is an example of an argument based on the behavioral assumption about
opportunism made by Williamson: Ex ante, self-interest induces the rent-seeking deal,
and ex post, more of the same tempts the official to use discretionary powers for serial
self gain. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 47 (1985)
[hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS]. As for characterizing the degree of
2005]
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with all of the counterparty considerations typical of a legal bar-
gain. This is not to suggest that dependent central banks refrain
from rent-seeking. Quite the contrary, deals between officials
and other constituencies may occur more frequently for the rea-
sons that form the predicate of the central bank hypothesis. In-
dependent governance does not determine the incidence of deal-
making, but rather the governance structure of the deal. In
other words, a viable pre-commitment mechanism lets the coun-
terparties pursue their expectations over a longer time horizon.27
What then does central bank independence in both developing
and developed countries really signal? Central bank independ-
ence is a sign of good things (other than low inflation) to come,
28
namely rents.
One implication of this view is that modeling rent-seeking as
a type of extralegal contract extends transaction costs analysis
to public institutions-in this case to a quasi-public institution
charged with conducting macroeconomic policy. 29 More gener-
self-interest involved as mild, moderate, or opportunistic, this Article asserts that con-
verting a public institution-that is, the interest rate setting mechanism-for private
gains is an opportunistic, rather than a mild degree of self-interest. Once officials have
ceded discretion over money policy to an independent rate setting mechanism however,
the mechanism blocks any ex post moves. See infra notes 31-35 for a wider consideration
of the analytical value of opportunism as an institutional framework.
27. Increasing the term of foreign investor commitment could contribute to length-
ening the term of loans sought by Cuban borrowers. See infra note 60 for a discussion on
the lack of medium- and long-term credit for Cuban borrowers.
28. Rents which would interest an investor in a host country might include inside
information from regulatory authorities, getting a hearing for investment concerns, or
securing advantages through informal contacts with and in respect of the central bank.
29. This type of application of transaction cost economics to public finance was con-
sidered as early as 1985:
An area to which transaction cost economics has made only limited contribu-
tions but that holds out considerable promise is public finance... But if the
choice and design of institutions is what public finance is all about, then
countless applications of transaction cost economics have yet to be made.
Problems of incentives and governance are enormously difficult in a political
context. Tolerance for greater variance in relation to private sector efficiency
assessments is likely to be needed.
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 26, at 394-95. Williamson also notes
the value of comparative study with institutions in socialist countries: "[A]lbeit difficult
to orchestrate, contacts between capitalist and socialist countries regarding the study of
governance structures-with attention to both similarities and differences-hold consid-
erable promise for deepening our understanding of those matters." Id. at 394.
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ally, the impact of creditor interests on state formation through
rent-seeking may be studied through transaction cost economics,
which uses the transaction as the relevant unit of analysis.
Transaction cost theory would suggest that the transaction must
have a governance structure and that the costs associated with
entering the transaction would determine whether the deal is
executed. 30 These transaction costs are matters of public inter-
est.
For example, assuming, as does this Article, that rent-
seeking drives state formation more broadly, a rent expenditure
budget of the deal implemented in any central bank's chartering
legislation would be useful. Such an analysis would treat rents
as notional outlays of budget resources. The analysis would
identify the financial stakeholders in central bank design, con-
sider competing deals between them and the government, and
finally, analyze the allocative efficiency and distributional im-
pact of the final deal enacted.3' Sobering behavioral assump-
tions about individual and institutional action have enormous
policy value when considering how private constituencies impact
state structure. 32 Assuming a more robust form of self-interest
explains much of daily economic life's ordinary depravity. 3 Such
30. Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost
Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306, 312. (1999). Williamson notes that one
reason why transaction costs economics has not applied to state action is that scholars
view the social and economic organization of the private and public sector differently. See
id. at 308-10. Quantifying rents transactions, however, helps to create a common unit of
account across both the public and private sectors.
31. Obviously, I am thinking about the tax expenditure budget concept developed
by Stanley Surrey. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure
Concept and the Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 679, 679-81
(1976). Rents analysis would shed light not just on central bank formation but also on
the central bank's recurring decision-making behavior, as the special interest which con-
tributed to formation may continue to influence subsequent interest rate determinations.
32. Rent-seeking is an example of opportunism: "By opportunism I mean self-
interest seeking with guile. This includes but is scarcely limited to more blatant forms,
such as lying, stealing, and cheating. Opportunism more often involves subtle forms of
deceit. Both active and passive forms and both ex ante and ex post types are included."
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 26, at 47. Bounded rationality is the
other major behavioral assumption of transaction cost theory. See id. at 45.
33. This charming phrase appears in an argument about judicial power from The
Federalist Papers: "And making the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of hu-
man nature, the number [fit for judicial office] must be still smaller of those who unite
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an approach also spans law and economics, alterity narratives, 4
and other postmodern methodologies35 which have historically
maintained theoretical boundaries with respect to each other.36
the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge." THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexan-
der Hamilton).
34. Postmodern study uses the word "alterity" to refer to the dynamics of other-
ness. "Postmodernism is obsessed with otherness." STEFAN HERBRECHTER, LAWRENCE
DURRELL, POSTMODERNISM AND THE ETHICS OF ALTERITY 3 (1999). As a subjective posi-
tion, alterity has been received in U.S. jurisprudence most directly through the develop-
ment of the outsider jurisprudence movements mentioned by Rubin. Although much out-
sider jurisprudence critically evaluates U.S. institutions, this Article uses the phrase
"alterity jurisprudence" in order to situate both this Article and outsider jurisprudence
into a globalized postmodern discourse. See also Francisco Valdes, Culture, "Kul-
turkamp," and Beyond: The Antidiscrimination Principle under the Jurisprudence of
Backlash, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 276-79 (Austin Sarat
ed., 2004). The behavioral assumptions listed by Williamson trace part of the subjectivity
of a notional "other," detached from socialization into noneconomic concerns. See
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 26, at 44-52. In terms of increasing
the allocative efficiency of the mind, this critical vantage point has enormous practical
(and theoretical) implications for self-reflection and collective action, both individually
and institutionally.
35. Edward Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Mi-
croanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1393, 1421 (1996). "Foucault does not ally
himself with critical theory or any prescriptions for radical change. As Nancy Fraser
suggests, however, this alliance is implicit in the entire work; his elusiveness is a matter
of style, not substance." Id. Foucault modeled power as a pervasive, ambient force-like
social gravity, if you will-independent of and prior to institutional arrangements, but
animating their nature. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH THE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON 26-27 (1991). Insisting on accounting for human activity through rent-
seeking analysis may help to show how the power field described by Foucault would
manifest itself at the cellular level of a person's actions and her influence over an institu-
tion.
36. See Rubin, supra note 35, at 1420-21. Rubin notes that the critical approaches
of law and economics and alterity jurisprudence have been essentially dichotomized in
the academic short-run due to the accident of history.
An obvious explanation is the divergent political predilections that gave rise
to each movement, but the correspondence between the political positions
and their methodologies is not logically required. That is, economic analysis
is not necessarily the exclusive instrument of the political right, nor decon-
struction the instrument of the left; political debate could have been carried
out within either methodological framework.
Id. at 1401-02. Rubin continues:
In fact, it is remarkable how disconnected the two movements are, given that
they have developed in the same academic institutions, published in the
same scholarly journals, and shared a common concern with law and legal
institutions ... Because any synthesis of these movements is likely to occur
[Vol. 27:3
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In the spirit of synthesizing critical and economic discourses,
this Article proposes a financing vehicle to remedy the signaling
issues raised by the Central Bank's governance structure. 37 The
importance of signaling to attract foreign financing becomes
clearer after appreciating the credit scarcity and illiquidity
which characterize Cuba's dire foreign financing position, and
will be described in the following Part.
C. The Implications of the Rent-Seeking Theory to the Central
Bank
Rent-seeking theory also supports the emergence of a de-
pendent central bank in a political economy without robust rent-
seeking by finance firms with interest rate preferences. By coun-
ter-implication of the thesis that central bank independence
serves as a pre-commitment mechanism for bargained-for rents,
the Central Bank is unlikely to gain independence without the
emergence of a nongovernmental creditor class with enough po-
litical clout to lobby its interest rate preferences. The Cuban
banking sector reforms of the 1990s have resulted in an institu-
tionally differentiated market structure, although centralization
of government discretion reduces the viability of any single
banking institution as a pre-commitment mechanism.3 8 Al-
though foreign banks may open representative offices on the is-
land, the government conducts all domestic banking. As a result,
Cuba does not have a robust private financial sector ready to
seek rents from the government through private deals .39 There-
fore, Cuban officials may restructure the banking sector with
relatively little resistance from external creditor interests. A de-
at the level of scholarly discourse, and not at the level of substantive political
positions, real possibilities for synthesis emerge primarily in this methodo-
logical realm.
Id. at 1412.
37. Making recommendations that are capable of being implemented is part of the
institutional microanalytic approach. Rubin notes, "[tihe microanalysis of existing insti-
tutions is more practical, at least in the short run, and more amenable to the specifically
legal approach of framing recommendations to existing policymakers." Id. at 1432. Both
the the rent expenditure budget and the collateralized debt proposed in Part IV are ex-
amples of such recommendations.
38. See CUBA AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 12, at 252-54.
39. Id. at 244-49.
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pendent central bank does not necessarily signal to foreign in-
vestors that inflation is on the way. Actually, it has unfortu-
nately been a fact of life in Cuba for some time. Instead, it sig-
nals that long-term rent-seeking is not one of the rules of the
40game.
Recommending government action to increase formal inde-
pendence by amending the Decree-Law creating the Central
Bank41 is futile. A private rent-seeking economy must grow be-
fore the financial sector can shape central bank design to serve
the term interests of the sector's balance sheet. For these rea-
sons, the Central Bank will become independent not due to po-
litical reform--even that urged by U.S. democracy activists-but
only after the entrenchment of a private creditor class capable of
pressing demands on government officials.
Since the Decree-Law does not create an independent insti-
42tution, and since more independence is unlikely in the future,
what may the Central Bank do now to improve the island's for-
eign financing position, including securing a longer term for for-
eign investment? Affirming the importance of more access to
foreign financing for Cuba, Part IV recommends a proposal to
use collateralized government debt to extend the term of official
borrowing and to signal openness to commercial expectations.
The relevance of this proposal becomes more obvious after un-
derstanding the credit scarcity and monetary confusion which
characterize the current Cuban economy, discussed in the fol-
lowing Part.
II. CUBA'S FOREIGN FINANCING POSITION
Cuba's foreign financing position is composed primarily of
limited foreign direct investment and debt obligations. Although
Cuba repaid its obligations to the International Monetary Fund
40. Although Charles Beard noted gaps in documentation of the economic interests
of the framers, he reviewed enough records to survey the economic interests at work in
the Constitutional Convention. See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 34-40 (MacMillan 1929) (1913). Less
documentary evidence about the Central Bank is available with which to survey the eco-
nomic interests that contributed to the adoption and structure of the Decree-Law.
41. See infra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing Decree Laws).
42. DECRETO-LEY 172 (1997) (Cuba).
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(IMF) after withdrawing from the organization in 1964, 43 Cuba
currently faces a debt sustainability problem and limited access
to other forms of foreign financing. The current foreign financing
position developed largely from the loss of favorable terms of
trade with the former Soviet Union and its trading partners.44
A. Foreign Direct Investment
In response to the loss of Soviet financing, Cuba has liberal-
ized its foreign investment market to attract foreign capital in-
flows. During the 1990s Cuba enacted several laws, including a
new foreign investment law, designed to recoup financing losses
caused by the loss of favorable terms of trade with the Soviet
Union and other Counsel for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) members. 45 To improve its contractual credibility with
43. See JAMES M. BOUGHTON, SILENT REVOLUTION THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, 1979-1989, at 758 (2001).
44. Marquetti Nodarse Interview, Institute for the Study of the Cuban Economy,
University of La Habana, in Havana, Cuba (Dec. 22-24, 2003) [hereinafter Marquetti
Nodarse Interview]. An investigator at the University of Havana's Institute for the
Study of the Cuban Economy, Dr. Marquetti Nodarse is one of the foremost authorities
on the Cuban economy, particularly in domestic and international monetary issues. Ex-
ports provide the exporting country with foreign exchange liquidity for, among other
things, payment of foreign currency external debt. Id. Between 1972 and 1986, Cuba's
main export (and import) markets were the members of the Counsel for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance (CMEA). Id. The CMEA was an autarchic trading block made up of the
USSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Mongolia,
Vietnam, and Cuba. Cynthia B. Schultz & Tamara Raye Crockett, Economic Develop-
ment, Democratization, and Environmental Protection, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 53,
55 n.9 (1990). The terms of trade with CMEA partners resulted in a financing subsidy to
Cuba, where Cuba exported sugar and nickel at a premium and imported oil at a dis-
count. See Marquetti Nodarse Interview, supra. The spread between these trades subsi-
dized the Cuban economy. Id. When the CMEA dissolved in 1985, Cuba lost this funding
spread. Id. By 1992, Cuba's volume of international trading had dropped to 1974 levels.
Id.
45. In 1996, Cuba passed the Reaffirmation of Cuban Dignity and Sovereignty Act,
Law No. 89, GACETA OFICIAL, Dec. 24, 1996, directing government agencies to use fidu-
ciary agencies and other conduits to protect the identity of foreign investors exposed to
legal risk from the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Helms-Burton) Act of 1996,
22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (1996). In 1997, Cuba passed a foreign investment law to facili-
tate foreign direct investment. See Foreign Investment Law, Law No. 77, GACETA
OFICIAL (1995). In 1999, Cuba provided that Cubans who assist in the implementation of
the Helms-Burton Act against foreign investors in Cuba may be punished by up to
twenty years imprisonment. See Law for the Protection of National Independence and
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potential investment partners, Cuba also signed numerous bi-
lateral investment treaties with other countries to limit the ex-
posure of their respective nationals to Cuba-sourced political
risk.46 Although the 1995 law improves the investment climate
over the climate produced by the prior foreign investment law,47
the legal framework for regulation has failed to optimize the
volume of foreign investment due to prospective investors' per-
ceived investment obstacles. 4s At the same time, the United
States has successfully injected U.S.-sourced political risk into
Cuban foreign investment subject to the Helms-Burton Act. 49 As
a result, efforts to attract foreign equity investment have not yet
attracted enough foreign capital to meet Cuba's financing
needs.50 After scant academic interest in Cuban law, Cuba's
modest liberalization reforms have produced a proportionate in-
crease in Cuba-related legal scholarship, illustrating how in the
the Cuban Economy, Law No. 88, GACETA OFICIAL (1999). Cuba also took steps before
enacting Law No. 77 to stimulate investment. See Jorge F. Pdrez-Ldpez, Cuba's Thrust to
Attract Foreign Investment: A Special Labor Regime for Joint Ventures in International
Tourism, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 221, 222-23 (1992) [hereinafter Prez-L6pez,
Cuba's Thrust]. Pdrez-L6pez is an eminent authority on Cuban macro- and micro-
economic issues.
46. See Jorge F. Pdrez-L6pez & Matis F. Travieso-Diaz, The Contribution of BITs to
Cuba's Foreign Investment Program, 32 LAW & POL'Y IN'L BUS. 529, 540 (2001).
47. See Venera A. Gallousis, Cuba's Flirtatious Love Affair With Foreign Invest-
ment: The Evolution of Laws 50 and 77, 5 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL'Y 81, 82-83 (2001).
48. See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Charles P. Trumbull IV, Foreign Investment in
Cuba: Prospects and Perils, 35 GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 903 (2004), at 903-04.
49. See generally Jorge Pdrez-L6pez, Foreign Investment in Cuba in the Second
Half of the 1990s (Apr. 30, 2000) [hereinafter Pdrez-L6pez, Foreign Investment in Cuba]
(unpublished article, on file with author). See supra note 45 (discussing the Helms-
Burton Act). Investors during this period came from Brazil, Canada, China, Chile, Do-
minican Republic, France, Germany, Honduras, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico,
The Netherlands, Panama, Portugal, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela. U.S.-Cuba Trade and Econ. Council, Inc.,
Foreign Investment and Cuba, at http://www.cubatrade.org (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
Since 1990, foreign firms have committed or delivered only about $1.65 billion in capital
in Cuba, although these firms had originally announced investment of more than $6 bil-
lion. See id.
50. Foreign investment also exposes Cuba to forward foreign exchange payables.
Foreign investors fund their investments with foreign exchange-not Cuban curren-
cies-thereby providing foreign exchange liquidity. Conversely, these investors want




U.S. scholarship market modes of economic production interact
with knowledge production."' Regretfully, recent changes in U.S.
policy have reduced the flows of both financial and intellectual
capital between Cuba and the United States.52
51. Many law review articles discuss the implications of Law No. 77, Cuba's most
recent foreign investment law. See John J. Coughlin, Cuban Foreign Investment Act: Op-
portunities for United States Corporations in a Post-Embargo Era, 23 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAVL L. REV. 299 (1999); see also Francisco J. Vifias, Establishing and Protecting
United States Foreign Investment in a Post Castro Cuba: By Waiting for Castro, Will U.S.
Investors Miss the Boat?, 5 J. TRANSNATL L. & POL'Y 227 (1996); Ron First, Cuba's
Changing Foreign Investment Climate: Castro's Attempt to Lure Foreign Investors, 9
TRANSNATL LAw. 295 (1996); Travieso-Diaz & Trumball IV, supra note 48; P~rez-L6pez,
Foreign Investment in Cuba, supra note 49. Other articles compare Law No. 77 with
Cuba's earlier attempt to attract foreign investment. See Gallousis, supra note 47, at 83.
Others discuss Cuba's foreign investment climate before the enactment of Law No. 77.
See Pdrez-L6pez, Cuba's Thrust, supra note 45.
52. Any mention of Cuban legal studies necessarily involves consideration of U.S.
federal constraints on academic freedom. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.565 (2005). In June 2004,
amendments to the Cuban Assets Control regulations radically curtailed the ability of
U.S. academics and educational institutions to conduct educational activities with Cuban
academic counterparties. See Correspondence Between Officers, Latin American Studies
Association (on file with author). For example, the amendments shortened the term of
the special academic license from two years to one year and required that all educational
programs in Cuba operated by U.S. educational institutions last at least ten weeks. Id.
Before the June measures, twenty-five U.S. universities operated educational programs;
now only three U.S. educational institutions maintain programs. Id. On November 19,
2004, the Academic Freedom Focus Group of the Cuban Academic Alliance met in Wash-
ington with representatives from forty-nine universities and educational exchange
groups to consider constitutional challenges to the June measures based on the First and
Fifth Amendments. See Academic Freedom Focus Group at the Cuban Academic Alliance
Conference Materials (on file with author). Astonishingly, the U.S. State Department
denied visas to each of the sixty-one Cuban academics and professionals who had been
invited to participate in the October 2004 meeting of the Latin American Studies Asso-
ciation, whose academic conferences have included a Cuban delegation since 1977. See
Syke Stephenson, Policy Winds and Exchange Flows: Forty Years of US-Cuban Academic
and Educational Exchanges (presented at the 2004 meeting of the Latin American Stud-
ies Association, publication forthcoming) (on file with the author). The U.S. government's
reason for curbing remittances from U.S. residents to the island is a fundamental part of
the U.S. government's policy behind the Cuban embargo: to impair the Cuban govern-
ment's ability to perform so as to create popular dissatisfaction which will ultimately
lead to the demise of the Castro government, by peaceful or violent means. 22 U.S.C. §§
6001, 6032(a) (2000). The wisdom of curbing remittances to create popular dissatisfac-
tion is impeccable. The recent curbs have in fact lowered the standard of living of large
numbers of Cubans who formerly derived marginal value from the dollar remittances.
However, the related premise that this popular deprivation will lead to a change in gov-
ernment has yet to be demonstrated ex post. Even ex ante this premise seems inconsis-
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B. Cuban Credit Market
The country's official debt now consists mostly of official
multilateral and bilateral financing, some private credit from
foreign banks, and short-term trade finance for exports and im-
ports.53 Cuba's foreign credit market has been insulated from the
market structure shift in emerging market debt from bank loan
financing to securities financing catalyzed by the U.S. Brady
Plan.54 Securities financing requires a nuanced debt manage-
ment approach to dealing with a group of diverse (and anony-
mous) bondholders with different liquidity and transaction cost
preferences-for example, a preference to bring suit as a hold-
out creditor rather than to join a restructuring agreed to by
other creditors. As a result, Cuban credit suffers not only from a
sub-investment credit rating but also from an outmoded debt is-
suance approach. 55
Predictably, Cuba's debt rating has a sub-investment rating
of Caa 1. 56 A sub-investment debt rating also increases the cost
tent with the conclusion-foundational to U.S. policy on Cuba-that the Castro govern-
ment operates a totalitarian police state which could effectively repress any sedition or
insurrection. In the case of Cuba, it obviously takes more than a tax on tea (or withhold-
ing tea at all for that matter) to spark another revolution.
53. See Hiram Marquetti Nodarse, La Deuda Externa de Cuba en los Afios Novent:
Evoluci6n y Perspectivas [Cuba's Foreign Debt in the 1990s: Evolution and Perspectives],
CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE LA ECONOMIA CUBANA [hereinafter Marquetti Nodarse, Cuba's
Foreign Debt].
54. See Philip J. Power, Note, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market
and its Implications for Further Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2719-20
(1996) (describing how "[iun March of 1989, then U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas
Brady... announced a new initiative designed to encourage banks voluntarily to reduce
the debt burdens of LDC debtors."). The Brady Plan ushered in a shift from bank syndi-
cate financing to capital market deals by securitizing whole bank loans into a new asset
class: emerging markets securities. Id. At first Brady bonds, which converted loan obli-
gations into bonds, were collateralized only with a special non-marketable zero-coupon
long-term bond, specially issued by the U.S. Treasury pursuant to its borrowing author-
ity under 31 U.S.C §§ 3102, 3121. Id. at 2721.
55. The policing and contract enforcement costs of recovering on sovereign debt are
an example of a transaction cost. See Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22
J.L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979). One benefit of the collateralized debt proposal discussed in
Part IV is that the debt flotation would expose Cuban government officials to current
financing practices applying the mechanism described above for Brady securitized debt.
56. Annual reports on the Cuban credit market are regularly issued by Moody's
Investors Services. See generally Moody's Investors Service Global Credit Research Re-
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of equity financing.57 Moody's58 reports that recent credit trends
include rising short-term debt, payment delinquencies, and de-
teriorating credit and collateral terms . Moody's also reports
that Cuba requires many non-U.S. trade creditors to roll over
short-term debt into longer term loans and to reschedule princi-
pal and interest payments.6 0 A leading Cuban economist argues
that the availability of only short-term credit is one of the Cuban
credit market's most severe problems.6 ' Nevertheless, with mi-
nor exceptions, Cuba's foreign debt has risen steadily.6 2 In the
ports for Cuba, June 2001 to July 2003 [hereinafter Moody's Reports for Cuba] (on file
with author).
57. Part of equity's value depends on the liquidity and solvency-essentially the
creditworthiness-of the underlying business. In this sense, equity investors are also
creditors of a firm. When interest rates rise, the cost of repaying fixed-rate debt drops,
and thus, the value of the debt drops, relieving the debtor and annoying the creditor. See
Douglas W. Elmendorf & N. Gregory Mankiw, Government Debt, in HANDBOOK OF
MACROECONOMICS (John B. Taylor & Michael Woodford eds., 1999).
58. See supra note 56.
59. See Moody's Reports for Cuba, supra note 56.
60. Id. By continuing to extend credit to Cuban borrowers in this situation, repeat
lenders may be implicitly recognizing that the stated credit maturities are shorter than
the terms that these lenders are willing to bear. U.S. based companies that export agri-
cultural products to Cuba, however, assume no risk of involuntary credit extension be-
cause these businesses may trade only on cash or non-U.S. origin credit (so that a non-
U.S. entity bears the trade credit risk). See Trade Sanctions Reform and Export En-
hancement Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7207 (2000). Allowing for credit financing of U.S. ex-
ports would mean that exporters would have to compete among themselves with respect
to credit terms. Predictably, U.S. exporters have objected to amending the Act to allow
for credit financing. See U.S.-Cuba Trade and Econ. Council, Inc., Economic Eye on
Cuba, Jan. 20-26, 2003, at 2 (results of survey of 307 U.S. based companies with export
interests in Cuba), available at http://www.cubatrade.orgleyeon2003/2OJanO3.pdf (last
visited Apr. 10, 2005). Exposing agricultural exporters to Cuba to compete on market
terms with each other with respect to trade financing-as they do in export markets
generally-is entirely in line with this Article's recommendations.
61. See Marquetti Nodarse, Cuba's Foreign Debt, supra note 53.
62. Id. (noting for the period 1989 to 2001 an increase in gross debt from $6.1652
billion (U.S.) to $10.893 billion (U.S.)). Marquetti Nordarse's data comes from the Cuban
Central Bank and its predecessor from 1948 to 1997, the National Bank of Cuba. Id.
This figure does not include a convertible ruble debt of $21 billion originally contracted
with the Soviet Union but repudiated by Cuba after the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Data on Cuban foreign debt is available from several sources. See, e.g., Bank for Int'l
Settlements, Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank Statistics on External Debt, at
http://www.bis.org/publlr-debt.htm (statistics compiled in a joint effort of the Bank of
International Settlements, IMF, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, and the World Bank) (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). The foreign debt statistics re-
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context of its per capita debt, national product, and export ca-
pacity, Cuba has a debt sustainability problem reflected in its
sub-investment grade credit rating of Caa1 and repayment his-
64tory. The paucity of granular data on Cuban external debt
makes analysis of credit trends difficult, but the conclusion of
debt unsustainability rests both on current and anticipated illi-
quidity. Due to its prior expropriations and limited transactional
experience in global trading markets-limited due to Cuba's
prior reliance on the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) 5 and to long standing United States restrictions on
market participation 6 6 -Cuba faces a fundamental contractual
credibility deficit, reflected most obviously in its credit rating.
No private debt market is likely to develop without a govern-
ment securities market . Noting the official position in favor of
selective market liberalization adopted at the Fourth Congress
of the Communist Party in 1991,68 it has been argued that the
leased by these multilaterals report less than one-tenth of Cuba's official reported bilat-
eral debt perhaps because the multilateral data comes from reporting creditors who may
underreport credit exposure to Cuba because of the attendant legal risks from United
States law. Marquetti Nodarse's data comes from Cuban authorities (for which admis-
sions of liabilities are a declaration against interest). On the basis of these interpretive
assumptions, this Article relies on Marquetti Nodarse's foreign debt data because it is
more comprehensive than that of other sources. This data evaluation problem is typical
of Cuban area studies.
63. See Moody's Reports for Cuba, supra note 56.
64. See CUBA AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 12, at 247. Since P~rez-L6pez' 1994
analysis, Cuba's external debt appears to have nearly doubled. See Archibald R. M. Rit-
ter, Cuba's Economic Performance and the Challenges Ahead, FOCAL, at 10 (demonstrat-
ing general increase in Cuba's external debt from 1994-2001).
65. Christopher A. Brook, Comment, Cuba: Undermining or Underlining the "Race
to the Bottom?", 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 197, 241 & n.345 (2004).
66. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7211 (2000).
67. In emerging capital markets, government securities are often the lead fixed-
income security in terms of reform. Debt managers often attempt to construct a yield
curve or to lengthen the term of debt with government securities, in part because it
tends to be the most liquid fixed income sector. As in the United States, the govern-
ment's borrowing rate is often the reference rate for private debt, as well. The Federal
Reserve Board, OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS 35-42, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
PURPOSES, at http://www.federalreserve.gov.pf.pf.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
68. Breaking with the Cuban Communist Party's historic opposition to foreign in-
vestment, the Fourth Party Congress recognized the need for increased foreign invest-
ment in market-friendly terms:
As a complement to the investment efforts the country must make, foreign
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Cuban government has approached its major official creditors,
informally, to signal increased transparency by releasing addi-
tional information about the economy.69 These modest steps may
signal increased willingness to transact in the global credit
market on commercial terms fundamentally different from pre-
vious Cuban postures, although, as discussed above, substan-
tially more liberalization has taken place in the area of foreign
direct investment than in the credit market.
Currently, investors lack enough information about Cuba's
creditworthiness to make investment decisions, especially re-. 70
garding uncollateralized investments. Cuban debt is compro-
mised by political risk from U.S. and multilateral sanctions, his-
toric expropriation risk, and the liquidity risk from unresolved
investment is being stimulated in branches and territories where it is war-
ranted, due to its contribution of capital, technology, and markets, utilizing
different forms of partnership for this end, such as joint ventures, coopera-
tive production, marketing agreements, shares, and others, according to the
regulations established by our legislation.
Resolution on the Country's Economic Development, in GAIL REED, ISLAND IN THE STORM,
THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY'S FOURTH CONGRESS 132-35 (1992) (noting Cuba's will-
ingness "to develop additional investment projects, giving preferential treatment to
[Cuba's] partners in Latin America and the Caribbean"). As a result of this economic lib-
eralization policy as well as other reforms approved by the Fourth Party Congress, the
Cuban Constitution was amended in 1992. See Perez Mildn, Motivos Para Una Reforma,
7 REVISTA 3, 4-6 CUBANA DE DERECHO (1992).
69. See Marquetti Nodarse, Cuba's Foreign Debt, supra note 53.
70. See Archibald R. M. Ritter, Unifying Cuba's Dual Monetary and Exchange Rate
Systems 17 (2003) [hereinafter Ritter, Unifying Cuba] (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Carleton University Library).
The dual monetary system currently in force in Cuba also makes an accurate
analysis of the Cuban monetary system and indeed the Cuban economy in
general difficult and maybe impossible. The dual currency and double ex-
change rate complications are not treated transparently in information pre-
sented publicly on inflation, the value of the money supply, the government
budgets, and the national accounts.
Id. This lack of information hinders Cuban area studies as well. Addressing the situation
of the island's economic professionals, Ritter notes that "[florcing Cuban analysts to work
without good basic information obstructs their endeavors to contribute to an understand-
ing of the economy and wastes their talents and energies." Archibald R. M. Ritter, The
Dual Currency Bifurcation of Cuba's Economy in the 1990s: Causes, Consequences and
Cures, 57 CEPAL REV. 113, 114 (1995) [hereinafter Ritter, Dual Currency]. The same
point may be made about public access to scholarly information about Cuban law, which
is dramatically underpublished. For example, Cuba has only one major scholarly legal
journal, REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO.
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private and public law claims based on prior expropriations and
Cuba's offsetting claims for embargo losses.71 Any purchaser of
Cuban debt would, therefore, demand a significant risk pre-
mium for holding uncollateralized sub-investment grade Cuban
debt. So, Cuban debt would have to be secured with enough liq-
uid collateral to make an investor indifferent between a Cuban
instrument and a less risky security. Liquid collateral is the ul-
timate financial "hostage" that a counterparty may hold as secu-
rity for a contractual commitment. 72 Expropriation-proof collat-
eral would make an investor indifferent to the legal risks of
investing in a country with limited private contract and property
rights.
Although U.S. law generally limits financial transactions re-
lated to Cuba,73 the Johnson Debt Default Act (Johnson Act) ad-
ditionally restricts the issuance of Cuban debt in the U.S. capi-
tal market, hence limiting the Central Bank's ability to act as a
fiscal agent for the government's official borrowings. 4 Specifi-
71. Investors with different preferences about risk (including credit, liquidity, and
legal risks, such as fear of prosecution for violating capital control sanctions) and trans-
action costs will value this bundle of Cuban contingencies differently of course. Regard-
ing risk, some investors may be willing to pay a "first-entry" premium for the early
chance to invest in Cuban assets, especially if these investors can make a meaningful,
simplifying assumption about trends in the Cuban economic climate. With respect to
transaction cost preferences, for example, some investors with successful relationships
with Cuban officials and institutions may be able to economize on information costs or
contract performance costs of investments in Cuba.
72. The commitments of contractual counterparties who offer "hostages" are more
credible. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 120-44 (1996).
73. 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (1996); 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (2002).
74. The Johnson Debt Default Act, 18 U.S.C. § 955 (2000) [hereinafter Johnson
Act], prohibits credit access in the United States for certain countries in default of their
obligations to the United States. The Johnson Act provides:
Whoever, within the United States, purchases or sells the bonds, securities,
or other obligations of any foreign government or political subdivision thereof
or any organization or association acting for or on behalf of a foreign gov-
ernment or political subdivision thereof, issued after April 13, 1934, or
makes any loan to such foreign government, political subdivision, organiza-
tion or association, except a renewal or adjustment of existing indebtedness,
while such government, political subdivision, organization or association, is
in default in the payment of its obligations, or any part thereof, to the United
States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than five
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 955. The sole defaulted U.S. obligation that triggers the Johnson Act against
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cally, the Johnson Act prohibits the purchase or sale within the
United States of the securities or obligations of any sovereign
who is in default of obligations to the United States and does not
belong to both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).
The Johnson Act was amended in 1994 to apply only to countries
that do not belong to the IMF or the IBRD.75 Cuba belongs to
neither.v
Part III of this Article will further propose a collateral ar-
rangement that could make foreign investors indifferent to
Cuba's historic credibility deficit, hence increasing the country's
access to foreign debt financing. Improved credit standing from
an isolated transaction would not directly enhance foreign in-
vestment as much as an upgrade of Cuba's country credit rating
because it is the country credit rating that impacts the terms of
foreign investment (since foreign direct investors bear country
credit risk through their investment). However, enhancing the
country's creditworthiness, even with respect to discrete trans-
actions, would improve the foreign investment climate by con-
tributing to a culture organized around commercial expecta-
tions.
C. Monetary Disincentives to Increased Foreign Investment
Since the decriminalization of the dollar in 1993, the peso,
the convertible peso, and foreign exchange each serve competing
money functions in a fragmented economy with both formal and
informal sectors. This currency balkanization has reduced for-
eign financing because without uniform money potential inves-
Cuba is a non-concessional credit of $32,267,000 issued by the U.S. Export-Import Bank.
See 2002 U.S. Government Foreign Credit Exposure report (known as the Salmon report
for the color of the report's cover) prepared as requested by Conference Report on the
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of
1990, Pub. L. 101-167, 103 Stat. 1195.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 955.
76. Both the IMF and the IBRD have a membership of 184 countries, while Cuba is
a member of neither. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, at httpJ/www.imf.org (last
visited Apr. 10, 2005)(noting the IMF membership number in About Us, and that Cuba is
not listed in Country Info); THE WORLD BANK GROUP, at http://www.worldbank.org (last
visited Apr. 10, 2005) (noting IBRD member countries in About Us/Organization/Member
Countries/IBRD Members).
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tors cannot evaluate the country's economic condition since no
single currency represents the national liquidity, consumption,
or production profile accurately. After a steady increase in dol-
larization, the Central Bank has very recently reversed this
trend by using its fiat powers to bolster the convertible peso.
1. Dollarization
The peso has been Cuba's official money since 1914.77 In
1993, the Cuban government decriminalized the holding of U.S.
dollars, outlawed since about 1960 although widely used as ille-
gal money.78 Legalizing the dollar greatly increased the use of
the dollar, so much so that until very recently the Cuban econ-
omy had become significantly dollarized.7 9 The most prominent
foreign observer of Cuba's monetary policies suggested that, in
fact, the dollar may have been a more significant component of
the Cuban money supply than the peso, although determining
the actual supply of dollars in Cuba is impossible.0 Since de-
criminalization of the dollar in 1993, Cuban monetary policy has
faced two choices in recent years: endorse some version of the
peso or increase dollarization. To the extent that any single cur-
rency could be established as the dominant national currency,
either option would have potentially improved the Cuban gov-
ernment's signaling capabilities by creating an intelligible me-
dium-a single currency-through which foreign investors could
77. Cuba's first monetary law in 1914 established that both the Cuban peso and
the U.S. dollar were national currencies. For a brief review of Cuba's banking history
from the 18th century through the 1980s, see Raul M. Shelton, The Historical Develop-
ment of the Cuban Banking System: Lessons for the Future, Cuba In Transition 1, in 4
CUBA IN TRANSITION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR
THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY (Aug. 1994) (held at Florida International Univer-
sity, Miami, Fla., Aug. 11-13, 1994), at http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba4/
shelton.html.
78. See DECRETO-LEY 140, GACETA OFICIAL (1993) (Cuba). Ritter notes that dollars
circulated illegally until 1993. See Ritter, Unifying Cuba, supra note 70, at 4 (analyzing
the currency structure of consumption and production in Cuba and policy implications of
selecting among competing currencies).
79. See Cuba: Reformas Estructurales en los Ahos Noventa. Resultados, Problemas
y Perspectivas [Cuba: Structural Reforms in the 1990s. Results, Issues, and Perspec-
tives], in CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE LA ECONOMIA CUBANA 62 (citing JUAN TRIANA
CORDOvf, LA ECONOMA CUBANA EN EL A1RO 2000 (CEEC 2001)).
80. See Ritter, Unifying Cuba, supra note 70, at 1, 10.
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analyze potential foreign investments. Only a Cuban national, of
course, would preserve Cuba's national sovereignty over mone-
tary policy.
Aimed at drawing money functions away from the burgeon-
ing dollar and toward a domestic currency, Cuba then intro-
duced the convertible peso, legally the equivalent of a synthetic
dollar."' However, the government could not legislate the holding
preferences of consumers as demand for the convertible peso
never matched demand for the dollar. Cuba also legalized the
use of the Euro in 2002, mostly in connection with the tourist
flows from European Union member states8 2 As a result, the is-
land developed a balkanized monetary system consisting of a so-
cialist peso-based economy, a marketized dollar economy, and-
to a much lesser extent-a Euro-economy. The system included
official and informal exchange linkages between the different
currency blocks, 3 but no single money that functioned both offi-
cially and informally84 In the short run, balkanization had a
81. Marquetti Nodarse Interview, supra note 44. The convertible peso must be
backed by foreign exchange. Banco Central de Cuba Resolution No. 80/2004 (Oct. 23,
2004). The purpose of the convertible peso was to capture seignorage (the revenue
earned by the sovereign from printing money) and to reduce demand for the U.S. dollar.
82. Banco Central de Cuba Resolution No. 80/2004 (Oct. 23, 2004).
83. Until recently, the Cuban government maintained an official exchange rate of
one U.S. dollar to one Cuban (nonconvertible) peso in the peso economy. See Ritter, Uni-
fying Cuba, supra note 70, at 32. Between 1991 and 2002, the informal exchange rate,
that is, the black market rate, ranged from average peso/dollar rates of 20:1 to 90:1. Id.
Most recently the peso/dollar rate has been at about 25:1.
84. Ritter describes the relationship between the two economies as of the mid
1990s thus:
The [peso sector] was in a state of deep depression, organizational collapse,
loss of confidence and general retreat. In contrast, the internationalized dol-
lar-based part of the economy was expanding rapidly despite the recession,
due to the increasing role of tourism and foreign investment, some public
policy changes, and the vacuum left by the contraction of the traditional
peso-based economy.
See Ritter, Dual Currency, supra note 70, at 115. Ritter notes the "underlying economic
logic" of the shift away from the socialist economy and toward the dollar economy, but he
points out a cruel irony:
Indeed, the irony of the situation is that those who have been among the
strongest supporters and beneficiaries of the Revolutionary regime in the
traditional socialist economy (soldiers, workers, educational and health pro-
fessionals) have been suffering material deprivation, whereas Cubans who
have maintained good relationships with family members abroad, small-
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harrowing impact on the distributional goals of socialism.85
2. Dedollarization
Dollarization involves many costs to the Central Bank.86
Further dollarization would transfer Cuba's monetary sover-
eignty to U.S. monetary authorities, whose rate setting policies
would then determine the island's interest rates, rendering
Cuba's monetary apparatus irrelevant. 87 Also, extracting rents
scale entrepreneurs and hustlers of various sorts receive substantially
higher incomes, either in dollars or through better-rewarded self-
employment.
Id. at 120.
85. Until recently, most Cubans depended for their basic foodstuffs on the govern-
ment ration book (la libreta) that sets prices for these goods at 1960-62 levels. Id. at 116.
Oxfam America concluded that that ration book does not satisfy minimum nutritional
requirements for the ration period. See MIREN URIARTE, CUBA SOCIAL POLICY AT THE
CROSSROADS: MAINTAINING PRIORITIES, TRANSFORMING PRACTICE 15, (2002), available
at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/pdfs/social-policy.pdf. Persons with dollars or converti-
ble pesos may supplement the ration book with other basic foodstuffs purchased at dollar
stores, but only sixty-two percent of the Cuban population had access to any dollars at
all. Archibald R. M. Ritter & Nicholas Rowe, Cuba: From "Dollarization" to "Euroization"
or "Peso Reconsolidation"?, 107 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC'Y 99, 107 (2002). Because this sta-
tistic includes anyone with access to even a few dollars, the percentage of those with
meaningful access is much lower. Marquetti Nodarse Interview, supra note 44. Persons
dependent only on peso-funded government salaries or pensions earn between five dol-
lars to twenty-three dollars a month. See Ritter, Unifying Cuba, supra note 70, at 14.
The average wages of government doctors, teachers, and engineers for 2000 was between
200-450 pesos a month. Id. Assuming an unofficial exchange rate of twenty pesos to the
dollar, those salaries translate to monthly income between ten dollars and twenty-two
dollars and fifty cents. Id. Balkanization also threatened the island's ability to maintain
current gains in human capital formation in the long run, as more people opted out of
professional employment in the peso sector and pursued, instead, relatively unskilled
jobs such as tourism services and sex work in the dollar sector. See generally Ritter &
Rowe, supra (discussing the consequences of dollarization on the Cuban Economy and
the shift away from the socialist to a marketized economy).
86. The Central Bank is decidedly not following the path of El Salvador, Ecuador,
Nicaragua, and Panama toward dollarization. See Tyler Maroney, Backgrounder: Dol-
larization, INITIATIVE FOR POLICY DIALOGUE, at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/
ipd/jLdollarization-bk.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005); James W. Dean, De Facto Dol-
larization (paper presented at the conference To Dollarize or Dot to Dollarize: Exchange-
Rate Choices for the Western Hemisphere, North-South Institute, Ottawa, Canada,
Oct. 4-5, 2000), available at http://www.nsi-ins.ca/ensi/pdf/12-dean.pdf.
87. Even liberal proponents of central bank independence recognize the downside
of abdicating monetary sovereignty to a foreign currency, either through formal adoption
of the foreign currency or by pegging the value of the domestic currency to the foreign
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by imposing capital controls in a dollarized system would be
harder for officials, a rent-seeking factor that militates against'
the adoption by Cuban officials of further dollarization. Addi-
tionally, Cuba would sacrifice all seignorage (the money earned
by the sovereign from issuing currency) generated from the is-
suance of pesos and convertible pesos, and would also sacrifice
the arbitrage profits 88 that the government could earn by collect-
ing dollars for goods produced by peso-paid Cuban workers.
Based on its recent dedollarization policies, the Cuban gov-
ernment seems to prefer increased "pesoization," which gives of-
ficials more formal control over the money supply and signaling.
The Central Bank's reversal of its dollarization policies began
with a controversy that reflected a jockeying between state and
private creditor interests in connection with Cuban letters of
credit. On July 16, 2003 the Central Bank decided to call in all
foreign exchange held by Cuban banking institutions and to im-
pose licensing requirements on their acquisition and use of for-
eign exchange. (This measure and its immediate implementa-
tion demonstrate how a centralized authority still manages the
island's foreign exchange liquidity.) The measure further served
to increase the riskiness of credit exposures by foreign banking
firms to Cuban credit institutions. The reaction to such may
serve, however, to illustrate modest rent-seeking by these for-
eign banking firms. Upset by the currency controls imposed
through the measure, these foreign banks refused to honor con-
currency. See Colares, supra note 10, at 171 ("First, under a currency peg, a government
ceases to be able to use the exchange rate to help the economy adjust to outside shocks,
such as a fall in export prices or sharp shifts in capital flows. Instead, domestic wages
and prices must adjust.").
88. See Ritter, Unifying Cuba, supra note 70, at 16-17.
89. Banco Central de Cuba Resolution No. 65/2003 (July 16, 2003). The Resolution
imposes licensing requirements whenever a Cuban bank wants to use foreign exchange.
Id. art. 8. The Resolution also calls in all foreign exchange held by state entities, Id. art.
3-4, presumably to increase the central government's foreign exchange liquidity. The
Resolution does not apply to firms financed with foreign or mixed capital. Id. art. 3. Im-
portantly for foreign investors and creditors, the Resolution clarifies that it does not in-
terfere with contracts made with foreign entities or with the settlement of debts requir-
ing settlement in foreign exchange. Id. arts. 7-8. For a discussion of the Resolution, see
Philip Peters, Cuba Imposes New Foreign Exchange Controls, HAVANA JOURNAL,
Aug. 4, 2003, at http://www.havanajournal.com/business_comments/815-0 4_0 Ctella
friend.php781.
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firmations of letters of credit issued by Cuban banks. 90 The Cen-
tral Bank capitulated, swiftly enacting Resolution 68 on July 23,
2003, that reassured foreign lenders the Resolution would not
block payment by Cuban banks to the confirming banks. 91 As-
suaging private creditor interests in this fashion, Resolution 68
may represent a successful attempt by a nascent finance sector
to get sectoral protection. In other words, the sector sought a
rent from the Central Bank in the form of a state promise not to
interfere with a pre-existing contract, in this case a letter of
credit.
Through a series of recent exchange rate interventions in
this triple currency monetary system, the Cuban government
has further reduced the importance of the U.S. dollar for domes-
tic transactions. First, in 2004, the Central Bank eliminated the
use of the dollar as medium of exchange and imposed a 10% sur-
92tax on converting dollars into convertible pesos. In March
2005, the Central Bank devalued the exchange rate for the con-
vertible peso against the nonconvertible peso (a domestic ex-
change rate because neither peso is used as money outside of
Cuba).93 One week later, the Central Bank abandoned parity be-
tween the U.S. dollar and the nonconvertible peso effective April
9, 2005.
94
90. See Mark Frank, Cuba Forex Controls Have Business Sector in Uproar,
HAVANA JOURNAL, Aug. 4, 2003, at http://havanajournal.com/business-comments
P819_0_4_0/.
91. Banco Central de Cuba Resolution No. 68/2003 (July 23, 2003); see also Frank,
supra note 90 (discussing Resolution 68).
92. Banco Central de Cuba Resolution No. 80/2004 (Oct. 23, 2004).
93. See Acuerdo No. 13/2005, Comite de Politica Monetaria, Banco Central de Cuba
(Mar. 17, 2005), available at http://www.bc.gov.cu/English/Laws/Agreement-13-05.pdf
Citing the growth in commodities and services in the nonconvertible peso-denominated
sector, the Acuerdo purports to revalue the purchasing power of the nonconvertible peso
against the convertible peso by 7%. Id. On a trip to Havana the week following this re-
valuation, the author observed the rapid readjustment of the nonconvertible-convertible
peso exchange rate. Peso-denominated prices stayed stable and consumers using the con-
vertible peso as a payment instrument supplemented the pre-March 18 prices with more
convertible or nonconvertible pesos.
94. See Acuerdo No. 15/2005, Comite de Politica Monetaria, Banco Central de Cuba
(Mar. 24, 2005), available at http'//www.bc.gov.cu/English/Laws/Agreement 15_05.pdf.
Citing the deterioration of the dollar in global foreign exchange markets, growth in the
domestic Cuban market, and improved terms of trade, the Acuerdo undertakes to create
different exchange rates for the purchase and sale of dollars. Id. When added to the 10%
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III. ANALYZING THE CUBAN CENTRAL BANK'S INDEPENDENCE
In light of Cuba's need for longer term foreign financing, the
country needs to send the right signals about foreign invest-
ment, including the message that long term exposures make
sense to foreign investors. However, the Central Bank is de-
pendent on Cuban government authorities rather than inde-
pendent of them. The Central Bank's governance structure re-
flects this formal dependence. Three types of statutory
provisions in particular determine whether a foreign investor
views a central bank as independent: freedom from involuntary
credit extension to the government; adequate capitalization; and
job security for central bank officials. 95 As a threshold matter,
formally independent central banks are subject to limits on their
credit extension to the government.96 Accordingly, reforms to in-
crease central bank independence often start by eliminating the
exchange rate tax, the Acuerdo contributes to what is an 18% tax on any dollars ex-
changed into convertible pesos. Id. The Acuerdo also notes that the effect of depreciating
the dollar against the convertible peso also-by operation of the convertible-
nonconvertible exchange rate-is to upwardly revalue the nonconvertible peso against
the dollar. Id.
95. See John W. Head, Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of the
IMF and the United States, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 70, 87 (1998) (identifying freedom
from deficit financing, adequate capitalization, and job security for senior officials as ma-
terial indicators of formal independence). Economists also consider these three factors to
be informal factors when evaluating central bank independence. See Alex Cukierman et
al., Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes, 6
WORLD BANK ECON. REv. 353, 361-69 (1992). With respect to informal factors that pre-
dict central bank independence, criteria include: (i) the personality of the central bank
governor or other high government officials, (ii) the turnover of central bank officers
(does not suggest independence), and (iii) the extent to which conflicts between the cen-
tral bank and the government are resolved in favor of the central bank (suggests inde-
pendence). Id at 361-67.
96. See Head, supra note 95, at 87. A comprehensive analysis by the World Bank
and other economists of both legal and informal factors notes the limitations of legal
formalism (be it capitalist or socialist) as an explanatory model:
Indicators based only on the law have two problems. First, the laws are in-
complete in that they cannot specify explicitly the limits of authority be-
tween the central bank and the political authorities under all contingencies.
These voids are filled by tradition at best and by power politics at worst. Sec-
ond, even when the law is quite explicit, actual practice may deviate from it.
Cukierman, supra note 95, at 355.
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central bank's involuntary financing of the government.97 Bank
capitalization and employment arrangements for central bank
governors and directors are also material.98 As the following ap-
plication of these three criteria demonstrates, the Cuban Cen-
tral Bank lacks formal independence under each of these.99
A. Central Bank's Exposure to Deficit Financing
The Cuban State Council established the Central Bank in
1997 through Decree Law 172 (Decree-Law).' 0 No document is-
sued by the Cuban government notes whether the Central Bank
was intended to be independent. Formal analysis of the Central
Bank, however, necessarily starts with the Decree-Law. 10' Arti-
97. The limitations of legal formalism have been noted:
Since the outcome of monetary policy may be strongly influenced by fiscal
policy, it is essential that the Central Bank has a high degree of autonomy.
To achieve this, the Central Bank Act will be amended to give the Bank a
more independent position within the government. In the new act, the provi-
sion of extending credit to the government, even within the fiscal year, will
be removed. The Central Bank and the government have agreed that the fi-
nancing of deficits in the budget can be done by attracting funds from the
capital market, and by this we mean both local and international.
Suriname: Wealth Beyond Its Measure, LATINFINANCE, Sept. 1998, at 40.
98. Head, supra note 95, at 87.
99. Independence may contravene socialist legality that values redistributive goals
and state coordination over principles of contract and private property. Gallousis, supra
note 47, at 85 ("In relation to foreign investment codes, socialist legality values social
public policy and legal flexibility over capitalist market reforms and the competing legal
principle of stare decisis. In choosing to do so, the socialist states sacrifice predictability
and stability in the law and its application.").
100. DECRETO-LEY 172 (1997) (Cuba). The Central Bank assumed the central bank
functions previously exercised by the National Bank of Cuba, established through Law
No. 13 of 1948. Banco Nacional de Cuba, BANCO CENTRAL DE CUBA, at
http://www.bc.gov.cu/English/commercial banks.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). Socialist
countries tended to consolidate both central and commercial banking functions into a
single government entity. The purpose of Cuban banking reforms was to disaggregate
banking activities into functionally differentiated entities responding in part to the func-
tionally differentiated approaches of the global banking system. See, CUBA AT A
CROSSROADS, supra note 12, at 253. For example, in Decree-Law 173, enacted the same
day as Decree-Law 172, the State Council provided that foreign banks may establish
representative offices in Cuba. See DECRETO-LEY 173 arts. 1, 6-7 (1997) (Cuba).
101. Unlike statutes passed by the National Assembly, decree-laws may be enacted
by the State Council only in between the National Assembly's legislative sessions.
CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA art. 74 (Cuba). The Cuban Constitution of
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cle 1 of the Decree-Law purports to create an autonomous entity
with independent legal personality: "The Cuban Central Bank is
fully autonomous and has independent legal personality and its
own financial estate..., 02 However, Article 20 contravenes the
first criterion for independence because the State Council may
direct the Central Bank to fund the Cuban government's deficit
spending: "The Cuban Central Bank may not issue currency in
order to finance a deficit between revenues and expenditures of
the State Budget, except as determined by the Council of State
within the limits established by that organ."103
In other words, the government may direct the Central
Bank to create money to finance deficit spending whenever gov-
ernmental receipts fall short of disbursements. Exposed this
way to the political short run, the Central Bank becomes a con-
duit for the State Council's preferences about the money supply
1972 created the Council of State, a body with executive and legislative functions com-
posed of cabinet-level ministers and presided over by the President of the Republic. Id.
arts. 89-94; See also COLECTIVO DE AUTORES, TEMAS DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO
CUBANO 66-71 (Maria Celia Guerra P6rez ed., 2004). Legal commentators have ques-
tioned whether as a formal matter a decree-law is inferior in legal rank to a law, but the
National Assembly seems to have resolved that question for practical purposes with re-
spect to Cuban sources of law by providing that the State Council's decree-laws may
modify or repeal laws enacted by the National Assembly. See FERNANDEZ BULTR, TEORIA
DEL ESTADO Y DEL DERECHO: TEORIA DEL DERECHO 168-71 (2004). Although Cuban
courts consider jurisprudence written by legal academics and practitioners a supplemen-
tal source of law, little scholarly writing exists on Cuban law by island academics.
FernAndez Bult6's treatise is an example of an influential manual used widely for both
teaching and practice. For a discussion of the decree-law as a source of law in Latin
America, see M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW 195 (2004). Mirow notes two types of
decree-laws, those issued by military governments shortly after a coup and those prom-
ulgated constitutionally. Id. In line with Mirow's distinction between these different
types of decree-laws, Fernindez Bultd explains the constitutional nature of Cuban de-
cree-laws as a function of socialist legality:
Allow me to also mention what are called Decree-Laws or Law-Decrees in the
bourgeois systems. These legal instruments have always been ways to mock
the law and the constitution; legal rules enacted by executive officials, nearly
always by de facto governments, through which these governments try to
displace the legislative powers of parliament, and which may be confused
with our Decree-Laws, which have unquestionable constitutional legitimacy
and support.
BULTP, supra, at 170 (translation by author).
102. DECRETO-LEY 172 art. 1 (1997) (Cuba).
103. Id. art. 20 (emphasis added).
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and rate-setting. Under this legal arrangement, peso price sta-
bility-and that of assets and liabilities valued in pesos-is un-
likely, because the Central Bank lacks control over the money
supply and hence, inflation.
Despite the government's lack of inflation data10 4 and the dif-
ficulty of evaluating real inflation due to the use of multiple cur-
105rencies, peso inflation has been a long-standing problem in
Cuba. 0 6 Financing Cuba's budget deficit through money creation
produced ongoing peso inflation during the early 1990s. 10 7 Al-
though not reflected in official estimates, the Cuban peso expe-
rienced high real inflation between 1990 and 1995, and contin-
ues to deteriorate as measured by the rising real costs of
obtaining basic foodstuffs and other household goods in an in-
creasingly "dollarized" economy.1o8
Another aspect of monetary independence from the central
government related to deficit financing is the scope of a central
bank's freedom to shape monetary policy-a central focus of cen-
tral bank law. 09 Predictably, the Central Bank's authority over
104. See Ritter, Unifying Cuba, supra note 70, at 11.
105. See id. at 17.
106. President Castro addressed peso inflation in 1972 soon after the announce-
ment that Cuba would join CMEA:
But, you see, we have a big problem: we have to collect the surplus money in
circulation. It is not good for so much money to be circulating. It causes infla-
tion, and that is bad. We must develop a policy aimed at collecting all that
money. Insofar as the essentials are concerned, though, there will be no
change in our policy on principles. Our policy will always be based upon the
principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
Interview by Marta D. Solis with Fidel Castro, President of Cuba, in Garden of the Pol-
ish Embassy, Havana (July 23, 1972).
107. See Ernesto Hernndez-Catd, Julio Carranza and Pedro Monreal on Economic
Change in Cuba: A Critique, in 5 CUBA IN TRANSITION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL
MEETINGS OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY (Aug. 1995)
(held at Florida International University, Miami, Fla., Aug. 10-12, 1995), at
http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba5/FILE02.pdf
108. See Ritter, Unifying Cuba, supra note 70, at 11. The peso surplus caused by
deficit financing through money creation increased prices for consumer goods. "Such ris-
ing prices constituted by definition inflation, even though the official position until re-
cently was that there was no inflation because of the price controls on the rationed goods
and services." See Ritter, Dual Currency, supra note 70, at 117.
109. See Jorge Guardia, Banking Law Developments in Latin America, in 4
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS 159 (1997) (reviewing central bank
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monetary policy is limited.11 The Central Bank's techniques for
implementing monetary policy include: directly setting interest
rates; setting reserve requirements; managing banking system
liquidity; issuing its own obligations; and making collateralized,
short-term loans to banks facing liquidity problems."' By adjust-
ing commercial banks' liquidity, these transactions affect lend-
ing resources-and hence, the money supply-by impacting the
volume of retail and commercial credit.
However, the Central Bank may not implement policy freely.
Instead, the State Council must approve the Central Bank's
monetary policy recommendations. This politically sourced
uncertainty about the money supply creates risk for any foreign
investor holding a peso-denominated investment because its
value may fluctuate unpredictably.
B. Capitalization and Appointment Tenure
Given the significance of the Central Bank's vulnerability to
state imposed requirements to fund deficits, this feature alone
would justify a formalist or legal process conclusion that the in-
stitution lacks independence. The Decree-Law's provisions on
laws for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela). Most central
banking laws from other Latin American countries instead address monetary policy. Id.
110. The Decree-Law addresses monetary policy in Article 3:
The Central Bank's objectives are to oversee the stability of the national cur-
rency's purchasing power; to help the economy to achieve equilibrium and
develop in an orderly way; to have custody of and administer the country's
international reserves; to ensure the normal functioning of internal and ex-
ternal payments; to exercise functions related to the discipline and supervi-
sion of the banks, non-banking financial institutions and representative of-
fices whose establishment in the country is authorized; and to carry out any
other functions which the laws entrust to it.
DECRETO-LEY 172 art. 3 (1997) (Cuba).
111. Id. art. 16-17. A reserve requirement is liquidity-a contra-asset account, in
accounting terms-which the Bank must set aside based on a subset of the Bank's li-
abilities. Id. (In other words, reserve requirements are a transaction cost to the Bank of
funding itself through issuing liabilities.). The Central Bank may inject liquidity into the
banking system by reducing the amount of reserve requirements. Id.
112. In 1998, the Central Bank president formed a Monetary Policy Committee to
advise on the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. See Monetary Policy,
BANco CENTRAL DE CUBA, at http://www.bc.gov.cu/English/mon-policy.asp (last visited
Apr. 10, 2005).
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capital structure and appointment corroborate this conclusion.
Independent capitalization is the second test for central bank
independence. 13Central bank capitalization matters to poten-
tial foreign investors because it signals whether the institution
can fund its monetary liabilities and other obligations, such as
debts, and whether the institution can survive financial difficul-
ties without requesting more funding from the government.
14
Under Article 6 of the Decree-Law, the Central Bank capitaliza-
tion consists solely of a contribution of an unspecified amount
from the state and an unspecified minimum reserve. Decree-
Law 172 states, "[t]he capital of the Cuban Central Bank is
formed by a capital contribution by the State and the leqal re-
serve, which must meet a minimum capital requirement."' " This
provision lacks clarity about the depth and liquidity of the insti-
tution's capitalization and the accounting treatment of future
earnings and losses. As a result, potential counterparties cannot
determine the net worth-and hence, their counterparty risk to
the institution-of the Central Bank.
The final criterion for independence considered here is the
tenure of a central bank's officers. The greater the employment
security of an official, the greater that official's freedom of ac-
tion.1 6 Expressed in terms of the rent-seeking model discussed
in Part I, indefinite tenure provides incentives for an official to
seek rent in the form of employment security. Yet, no Cuban
Central Bank officer enjoys the relatively certain tenure of a
term appointment. The State Council and the Council of Minis-
ters may remove officers for failure to comply with their statu-
tory duties.1 7 However, neither the Decree-Law nor the Consti-
113. Head, supra note 95, at 87.
114. Id. at 81-82.
115. DECRETO-LEY 172 art. 6 (1997) (Cuba). Compare, for example, the central
banking statute of Bosnia and Herzegovina, adopted at approximately the same time as
the Decree-Law. The Bosnian statute details the central bank's capital structure, includ-
ing provisions for allocating annual profit and loss and for covering potential capital
deficits. See Legislation of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ch. 3, arts. 25-
30 (1997), at http://www.cbbh.ba/en/regulations.html [hereinafter Legislation of the Cen-
tral Bank].
116. Head, supra note 95, at 87.
117. DECRETO-LEY 172 art. 50 (1997) (Cuba). In contrast, the Bosnian Central
Bank law provides that the term of each governor is six years and that he may be re-
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tution imposes process constraints for removal. Indefinite tenure
subject to removal by government officials makes these officers
accountable to these officials and their monetary policy prefer-
ences. Nevertheless, Francisco Sober6n Valdds has served as the
Central Bank's first president continuously since his term began
on January 23, 1997."8
IV. COLLATERALIZED GOVERNMENT BORROWING TO SIGNAL
FIscAL SELF-BINDING
The Cuban Central Bank's failure to signal openness to long
term rent-seeking through structural independence does not
send a favorable investment signal. Given the importance of in-
creasing foreign financing and recognizing the potential value of
signaling to this end, the Central Bank should conduct a collat-
eralized government borrowing. 19 As suggested by the argument
that rent-seeking influences public financing decisions,
opportunities for mutually beneficial arrangements between
officials and financial sector interests-and not the relative
policy merits of this proposal-will predict its adoption. This
recommendation deliberately avoids questions of internal Cuban
sovereignty in order to model a discourse that focuses on the
contractual expectations of market counterparties. While
liberalization advocates often link economic liberalization to
democracy reforms, liquid collateral makes possible
transactional certainty regardless of the counterparties'
moved only upon election to a public or executive office, criminal conviction, personal in-
solvency, or for personal misconduct. Legislation of the Central Bank, supra note 115, ch.
2, arts. 8, 11. Only the Bosnian President may exercise the power of removal for cause.
Id. art. 11.
118. See About the BCC, BANCO CENTRAL DE CUBA, at
http://www.bc.gov.cu/English/about-bcc.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). The strong per-
sonality of the Cuban President is a matter of public knowledge. The same cannot be
said for the Central Bank president, Francisco Sober6n, although he has served continu-
ously since his appointment in 1995, potentially suggesting some measure of institu-
tional independence. See Id.
119. Central Bank President Francisco Soberon recently sent a financial signal by
announcing of a budget surplus. See Associated Press, Cuban Central Bank Chief Says
Island Sees First Surplus in Decades, GLOBAL EXCHANGE, Mar. 29, 2005, available at
http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/cuba/2975.html. Unfortunately, the
announcement has limited signaling value because the announcement does not quantify
the surplus nor explain the budgeting methodology used to determine the surplus. The
announcement is more a political rather than a market signal.
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the counterparties' respective political economies. 120
Given Cuba's subinvestment country credit rating and the
ongoing pattern of unpredictable government actions which dis-
rupt commercial expectations, the Central Bank's ability to
meaningfully signal is substantially impaired. Because central
bank independence may be too highly associated with liberal
market economies, a discrete transaction replicating fiscal self-
binding on a small scale may provide an acceptable alternative
to the Cuban government.
In an asset-backed securities issuance, the government
would deposit liquid collateral and receivables into a special
purpose vehicle, which would then issue securities. Assuming
adequate collateralization, the credit quality of some of these se-
curities would exceed Cuba's current subinvestment grade credit
rating. Given the country's current illiquidity, earmarking ex-
propriation-proof collateral and receivables would require a fis-
cal sacrifice. 12' To insulate foreign investors from any govern-
mental attempt to claw back the collateral, an escrow account
could be set up with a foreign trustee to hold the collateral.
122
120. Market reform recommendations for socialist countries fall into two camps:
those which conclude central planning is incompatible with market mechanisms and
those which selectively incorporate market reform elements within socialism. See P~rez-
Lpez, Foreign Investment in Cuba, supra note 49, at 239-44. The collateralized debt
proposal is an example of the latter, which is also the view ascribed by Perz-L6pez to
the Cuban government in its 1990s liberalization reforms. Id. A market-friendly proposal
such as this, though, may alarm some progressive legal academics concerned about the
track record of liberal reforms in Latin America. For example, by giving foreign creditors
preference on government liquidity over claims of other creditors-including Cubans liv-
ing on the island-this deal raises fairness questions not considered here. In Cuban area
studies, the negative experience of other countries with liberal reforms must be consid-
ered in light of Cuba's longstanding exclusion from markets. Progressive academics
should consider that the prospect for socialist adaptation to a market economy may be
greater in the case of Cuba than it has been for countries that were already integrated
into a market trading system. For similar reasons, rent-seeking-though typically
viewed as undesirable for policy reasons-may have welfare effects in the case of Cuba.
121. Complete liquidity funding of the vehicle before issuance would result in the
highest bond rating for the securities. To the extent that any funding of the vehicle is
done on a forward basis or in installments, opportunities for breach exist.
122. By transferring the collateral to an off-shore trustee beyond Cuba's territorial
jurisdiction, the Cuban government would be-like Ulysses, see discussion supra note
25-unable to change its mind and recover the collateral in the future in jurisdictions
which recognize territorial limits on a sovereign's power to expropriate. For example,
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Such a collateral arrangement would put to rest both investors'
liquidity risk and political risk concerns based on Cuba's history
with default due to expropriation.
Though not as significant a precommitment mechanism as
an institutionally independent central bank, collateralized debt
issuance involves fiscal self-restraint to the extent the govern-
ment sacrifices a current liquid revenue stream in favor of fund-
ing a longer term obligation. Successfully floating one collateral-
ized government borrowing would send a significant signal to
market counterparties with investment demand in Cuba. More-
over, the deal structure proposed in this Part would, among
other things, give the Cuban Central Bank experience with a
state-of-the-art funding structure, asset-backed securities.
The Central Bank could also increase transparency simply
by publishing its balance sheets periodically. In evaluating that
recommendation, the Central Bank would have to consider the
tradeoffs involved in making its balance sheet more transparent.
Without transparency, the Central Bank might save on borrow-
ing costs in the short run by (opportunistically) exploiting the in-
formation asymmetry about state finances. In the long run,
more transparency about the government's global financial posi-
tion is needed to increase foreign investment as well. A regularly
published balance sheet would reduce the information costs to
potential investors. The simplest way to increase transparency
about the Central Bank's financial condition would be to publish
the Central Bank's balance sheet regularly.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS TO U.S. AUTHORITIES
The Cuban authorities could unilaterally implement the
proposal discussed in Part IV. However, U.S. law imposes major
legal obstacles on the Cuban government's ability to develop and
U.S. courts will generally respect a sovereign's attempt to expropriate property as an act
of state only if the property is in the territory of the sovereign. See Lee C. Buchheit, Act
of State and Comity: Recent Developments, in JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL DEBT OBLIGATIONS 96 (D. Sassoon & D. Bradlow eds., 1987). Cf Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (applying the state doctrine to the
Government of Cuba's expropriation of sugar located in Cuba's territorial waters) In
Sabbatino, the property in question was in Cuba's territorial jurisdiction. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. at 401.
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maintain its financial signaling media. Accordingly, this Part
will make some recommendations as to reforms which U.S.
lawmakers may want to consider in order to increase the Cen-
tral Bank's freedom of action over public financing and financial
market signaling.
A. Repeal of the Johnson Act
According to the legislative history of the Johnson Act, 123 its
main purpose was to protect U.S. citizens from acquiring foreign
securities whose risk of default was difficult to evaluate because
of lack of information. 124 Although these restrictions may have
served U.S. investors in their day, the Johnson Act now limits
the portfolio management and investment preferences of U.S.
and other investors, who, depending on their portfolio, might re-
duce systemic investment risk through holding Cuban debt.
Commentators agree that the Johnson Act should be repealed
because it fails to accomplish its stated goals, and, instead, cre-
ates legal uncertainty for lenders trying to comply with the
Johnson Act. 125 Moreover, Cuban debt would contribute to the
depth and liquidity of U.S. capital markets, founded on a com-
mitment to be an internationalized market.
26
This Article provides further support for repeal. The John-
son Act was enacted before the implementation of the statutory
disclosure standards for foreign sovereigns contained in Appen-
127dix B of the Securities Act of 1933. Accordingly, several legal
and market changes since 1934 have eliminated the original evil
that prompted the statute, that is, information costs to U.S. in-
vestors of sovereign debt obligations. Securities rating agencies
now provide detailed information about the payment probabili-
123. See supra note 74 (discussing the Johnson Act).
124. See Charles 0. Prince III, The Johnson Debt Default Act: How to Comply with
What's Left, 98 BANKING L.J. 147, 148-49, 152 (1981).
125. See id. at 164-65; see also Committee Report by the Committee on Foreign
and Comparative Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Johnson
Act Should Be Repealed (1979), COMMITTEE REPORTS 1979-80, 35 REc. AB CITY NY 47-
48 (Oct. 1980).
126. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934) (providing specific
provisions in Section 2, 30, and 30A, for foreign transactions and authorities).
127. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, §77aa, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1933).
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ties of foreign sovereigns. The development of asset-based secu-
ritization-spurred in part by the Brady Plan-means that gov-
ernments can issue asset-based bonds that are more creditwor-
thy than the general obligation bonds issued by sovereigns at
the time of the Johnson Act. Moreover, the migration of sover-
eign debt from commercial banks' loan books to mutual funds
and other institutional investors spreads the risk that unwitting
investors will run afoul of the Johnson Act by inadvertently ac-
quiring a forbidden security.
Increased membership of sovereigns in both the IMF and
the IBRD has narrowed the universe of countries subject to the
Johnson Act exclusively to Cuba and North Korea. The Johnson
Act also keeps U.S. investors from making direct foreign in-
vestments 128 that might strengthen the commercial ties between
the United States and any delinquent debtor nation. Finally,
since the adoption of the Johnson Act, Congress has given the
Executive branch a broad range of economic sanctions 129 provid-
ing more nuanced effects than the blunt prohibitions of the
Johnson Act. As a result of these factors, the financial social
costs of the Johnson Act are no longer justified.
B. Facilitating Access to Foreign Exchange Swap Lines for
Currency Stabilization
Effective government borrowing programs also benefit from
currency stabilization programs to preserve the foreign ex-
change value of the currency in which the country borrows. 30 As
part of currency stabilization, central banks enter into swap
lines of credit with other central banks and financial intermedi-
aries to acquire foreign exchange to fund currency stabilization.
These swap lines are the principal transactions a central bank
conducts as part of its international activities. Section 3 of the
Decree-Law is the main source of the Cuban Central Bank's
authority over international activities. 131 The Decree-Law pro-
128. 18 U.S.C. § 955 (2000).
129. See, e.g., International Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) § 1702, 50 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1701, 1702 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
130. Obviously, this is not an issue to the extent that Cuba becomes more fully dol-
larized.
131. DECRETO-LEY 172 art. 25(c)-(d) (1997) (Cuba).
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vides the Cuban Central Bank with ample authority to conduct
these liquidity transactions, 132 but the Central Bank's relation-
ships with other central banks is hampered by the legal disabil-
ity imposed by U.S. law. U.S. law most dramatically keeps the
Central Bank from exercising the sovereign functions proper to
any central bank. The Cuban Assets Control regulations 33 keep
the Central Bank from establishing the swap credit lines dis-
cussed above with the full market of financial intermediaries,
despite the willingness of certain firms to risk noncompliance by
swapping with the Central Bank notwithstanding the legal risk
from U.S. regulation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The impact of creditor interests on central bank design-and
other public institutions-may be appreciated from institutional
analyses concentrated historically on private firm structure. De-
spite the deeply contemptible restraints on Cuban area studies,
scholarship should begin to create a discourse forum for public
questions about Cuban nationality and market structure free of
the diseconomic projects associated with much of the Cuba
"transition" movements. The role of educational institutions is to
counter federal, and other, restraints on academic freedom and
to pursue scholarship and activism-including market structure
reform activism--consistent with a modern vision of the Cuban
state.
132. Id. For example, Cuba does not participate in the Bank for International Set-
tlements (BIS), a multilateral forum for central bank cooperation. Bank for International
Settlements, Organisation and Governance, at http://www.bis.org/about
orggov.htm#pgtop (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). The purposes of the BIS are to
promote the co-operation of central banks and to provide additional facilities
for international financial operations; and to act as trustee or agent in re-
gard to international financial settlements entrusted to it under agreements
with the parties concerned.
Statutes of the Bank for International Settlement art. 3 (1930) (amended 2003), avail-
able at http://www.bis.org/about/statutes.htm. Countries participate in the BIS by invi-
tation, based on "the desirability of associating with the [BIS] the largest possible num-
ber of central banks that make a substantial contribution to international monetary co-
operation and to the [BISI's activities." Id. art. 8(3). If Cuba can meet this standard, the
country would have a basis for requesting an invitation to join the BIS. See id.
133. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (2004).
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Conventional axioms of government design, like the central
bank independence hypothesis, may describe outcomes in a de-
veloped country, but these axioms need critical review before be-
coming normative standards for less developed countries. Iden-
tifying the governance structure of rent-seeking deals between
central banks and their constituencies shows how private credi-
tor interests impact the workings of financial regulations. To
that end, using opportunism to model individual and institu-
tional action makes theory more relevant, especially that of lib-
erals, progressives, and deconstructionists on the left (island,
diaspora, and elsewhere).
Admittedly, neither the Cuban Central Bank nor U.S. law-
makers will likely implement the recommendations made here
any time soon. In the meantime, island, diaspora, and other
scholars should focus attention on the public questions implicit
in the Cuban credit market. Given the resources of the U.S. le-
gal academy, individual U.S. academics should nurture ties with
Cuban academics and, in this way, integrate the Cuban legal
academy into the global academic market. Relatedly, the lead-
ership at U.S. academic institutions should resist, oppose, and
denounce the suffocating limits currently in place on academic
freedom in Cuban area studies. Transition, after all, begins at
home.
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